State of Utah v. Richard Ivan Lloyd : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Richard Ivan Lloyd : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Larry R. Keller; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Lloyd, No. 14472.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/320
**mm UTAH SUPR£*e COURT 






IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
RICHARD IVAN LLOYD, 
Defendant-Appellant 
.Case No. 14472 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a non-jury trial in The District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake Count}/-, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, presiding. 
I 
LARRY R. KELLER 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
343 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
VERNOR ROMNSY 
Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
F I L E D 
AUG 10 1976 
"X Perk, Stiprem* Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION TN THE LOW'KK COUNT . 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A VEHICLE 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §41-1-109 (1953) IS NOT~A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR 
VEHICLE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-404 
(A3 AMENDED 1973) . . . . . . .4 
POINT II: THE COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON 
THE THEFT CHARGE PRECLUDED A LATER FINDING THAT APPELLANT 
WAS GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. . . . . . . . . 8 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 
CASES CITED 
State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P 2d 154 (1969) . . . . c'• " ?. 1 1 
State v. Close I'.fl Utah 2d 1.44, 499 P.2d 287 (1972) . . . . . 6 
State v. Kelsey, 5J*. V .!d 1UUI l i'-TO . . . . . 
Sandoval v. People, 17b Col >•» I 4 , '+90 F 2d 1298 (1971) . . . . .6 
S t a t e v. Smi th 'III III ,ih a,1,,1 h.1 I1 ,M Mil l i I ' M h i . . . . . . . 6 
S t a t e v . Woolman, 84 Utah 2 3 , 33 P .2d 640 l l q 3 t ) . . . . . 6 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah i,out.' win I 'DI L-1.09 O . W ) . 4 
Utah Code Ann, $ 4 1 - 1 - 1 1 2 (1953) . . . . 
TTi-.jh CIHIP Ann '*i 7ft- 3- 1 iVt i"l 'Vi ] ,M niTiernlfMl I . . . . . . . . j 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Table of Contents continued) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 (1973 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann.§76-3-301 (1973 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1973 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1973 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-2 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-33-4 (1953) 
C.R.S. 1963, 13-13-2 
1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
RICHARD IVAN LLOYD, : Case No. 14472 
Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a conviction of Unlawful Taking of 
a Vehicle, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953), one of the 
provisions of Utah's Motor Vehicle Act. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged with the crime of theft of an operable 
motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in an information filed in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District In and For Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on December 5, 1975. On that date, appellant 
entered a plea of not guilty (R.6). 
On January 23, 1976, appellant waived the jury and tried the matter 
before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall. Judge Hall acquitted the appellant 
of the charge of auto theft contained in the information (R. 91, at 
lines 24-26). The Judge then heard arguments of counsel on the question 
as to whether or not the State could refile a misdemeanor charge of 
Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle (or Depriving an Owner as it is 
commonly referred to) (R. 91-95). The Court then indicated that it Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
found the appellant guilty of that charge which the Court found to be 
a lesser and included offense of Theft as charged in the information 
(R. 95-96) . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's verdict of 
guilty of the charge of Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle on the 
grounds that: (a) the court had acquitted appellant of the felony and 
then later decided to convict him of the misdemeanor; and (b) that the 
crime of Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle is not a lesser and included 
offense of Theft- Therefore, the Court's verdict of not guilty of 
the charge in the information requires this Court to discharge him 
from the custody of the Third District Court. 
\ . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arthur A. Polad testified that his automobile had been parked 
in front of his apartment at 341 Post Street (900 West) approximately 
7:30 p.m. on the evening of September 28, 1975 and he did not see 
it again until the following morning when he found it damaged beyond 
repair. (R. 31-34) 
Police officer Tim Phelan testified that at about 3:00 a.m. 
on the morning of September 29, he observed Mr. Poland's vehicle in 
the middle lane of 4th South between 2nd and 3rd West. He identified 
the appellant . as having been slumped behind the wheel of the vehicle 
unconscious. (R. 37, 38) The officer testified that the appellant's 
lips were blue, but there was no evidence of injuries. He also stated 
that the paramedics on the scene diagnosed the appellant's condition 
-2-
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as an overdose of narcotics (R. 41). 
Susan Williams, the appellant's ex-wife,testified that he had 
been at her apartment at 415 Post Street until about 2:00 - 2:30 a.m. 
(R. 58) She further stated he called her from a hospital about 
5:00 a.m. and told her he had "OD'd" on some heroin (R. 60). When 
he had been placed in the ambulance at the scene, a hypodermic needle 
he had had in his possession fell out onto the ground (R. 47). 
Counsel for both the State and appellant entered into a stip-
ulation that if a Dr. Richard L. Jackson were called to testify, he 
would testify that he treated the appellant in the emergency room of 
Holy Cross Hospital in the early morning hours of September 29, 1975 and 
diagnosed his condition as an overdose of the drug heroin. Further, 
the Dr. would have testified that appellant lapsed in and out of 
consciousness and that one who is overdosed on heroin could commit acts 
which he does not consciously remember (R. 86-87). 
Appellant testified in his own defense that after leaving his 
ex-wife's apartment, he went to Sherwood Park and "shot up" a large 
quantity of heroin (R. 82-83) . He further testified that he had no 
recollection as to what happened after that and had no memory of 
getting into a car (R. 83-84). 
-**-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A VEHICLE PURSUANT 
TO UTAH CODE ANN. §41-1-109 (1953) IS NOT A LE~SSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE 
PURSUANT~TO UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-404 (AS AMENDED 1973). 
The defendant was charged with the crime of Theft pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1973 as amended) which provides: 
"a person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.11 
Further, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1973 as amended) provides: 
"Theft of property. . .shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if: 
. . .(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle;" 
Two other crimes involving unauthorized use or possession of a 
motor vehicle appear in the Utah Code, however, these crimes are 
included as part of Utah's Motor Vehicle Act and not as part of the 
Criminal Code. Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953) is uniformly interpreted 
as punishing the knowing possession of a stolen motor vehicle as a 
felony, while Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953) punishes the unlawful 
taking of a motor vehicle with intent to only temporarily deprive 
the owner of his possession as a misdemeanor. That statute provides: 
"Unlawful taking of vehicles a misdemeanor.--Any person who 
drives a vehicle, not his own, without the consent of the 
owner thereof and with intent temporarily to deprive said
 ( 
owner of his possession of such vehicle, without intent 
to steal the same is guilty of a misdemeanor. The consent 
of the owner of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall 
not in any case be presumed or implied because of such 
owner's consent on a previous occasion to the taking or 
driving of such vehicle by the same or a different person. < 
Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to^ 
or an accomplice in any such unauthorized taking or driving 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i s described at .: 'miscemeanjr -.enough ;,'tah s iew ^ rin:^ .a. Code, 
i II ] 9"; 3 provides for three different types of misdemeanor offenses , *' 
i t i s clear that: the legi slati * e intent in enacting -. .. * . . j was to 
provide the same punishment for a misdemeanor as was -rovided for I i:i 
LI l.ali." " def i: i i t I 'enal Code :  !: Fi ir the/ ic: , 1 Jl all: L CI ie ' - ) 
(as amended 1973) provides • 
"An offense designated a misdemeanor. either ~: ~: -
:::,ode or in another law, without specification at :c ounisr-
ment or category, is a class E misdemeanor 
A class B misdemeanor is punishable by impxi isonment for a term not 
exceeding s i x months ox: a f:i ne n ot exceedi iig $299 4' 
Since 41-1 -112 is not involved in this appeal, attention wil 1 
"be focused on, the relati onshi p between 41 • 1-109 and 76-6-412 , supra. 
It is established law t'a* .- .fi^Ccnt can ^e .onvicred oniy 
of the offense charged in the information N: : an offers- w!r:/h :? 
I] ecessaril y incl i ided :i n tl I 2 cl: .. : ~ 
Ann. §77-33-6 (1953) provides: 
1
 " 'The jury may find the defendant guilty of any 
offense the commission of which is necessarily included 
in that with which he is charged in the indictment or 
information, or of an attempt to commit the offense," 
Just exactly what constitutes an offense which is "necessari ly 
included11 is a subject which this Court has chosen to deal with on 
1 Utah Code Ann. §76-3-104 
2 See Utah Code .Ann, §76-1-16 (Repealed 1 973) 
3 I It ah Code An • c :i § 76 3 204 ( is amende* I 1 9 73) 
• Utah Code Ann, §76-3-301 (as .amended 1973) 
5.
 u t a h C o d e AnUm §77.33-4 (1953) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a case by case basis. See e.g. State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 
640 (1934); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936); State v. 
Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972). 
This Court dealt directly with the question of the relationship 
of 41-1-109 with Utah's grand larceny statute in effect in 1969 in the 
case of State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P.2d 154 (1969). In that 
case, the defendant was charged with grand larceny pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-38-3 (Repealed 1973). One of the defendant's assignments 
of error was that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on what 
he construed to be the lesser and included offense of Unlawful Taking 
of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953), supra. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ellet said: 
ffIn the instant case the jury found the defendant guilty 
of intending to deprive the owner permanently of the use 
of his car, and we cannot see why they should also have been 
required to decide if he only intended to deprive the owner 
temporarily. The two crimes are based upon contrary intentions 
in the mind of the defendant. However, this does not mean 
that one offense is necessarily included within the charge 
made of the other. An acquittal of one is not a bar to a 
prosecution for the other offense. The law is stated in 
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §343, to be 
as follows: 
* * * Furthermore, since the offense of taking and using a 
motor vehicle without the consent of its owner is distinct 
in its elements from the offense of larceny, an acquittal 
of one of these offenses is not a bar to a prosecution for 
the other. * * *" 
456 P.2d 155. 
There can be little doubt from this language that this Court has 
clearly held that 41-1-109 is not a lesser and included offense of 
felony auto theft. Although decided prior to the adoption of 76-6-404 
and 412, supra, this case is clear authority for appellant's argument. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado has also ruled that the crime of 
joyriding is not a lesser included offense of the crime of auto theft 
in Sandoval v. People, 176 Col, 414,490 P.2d 1298 (1971). The elements Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of Colorado's joyriding statute0 are virtually identical to Utah 
Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953), and Colorado's theft statute is also 
identical to Utah's.7 Although lengthy, the following segment of 
Justice Hodge's opinion is quoted by appellant as presenting in a 
nutshell the legal issue presented by this point on appeal: 
"From the foregoing discussion, it appears clear that 
an essential element of the crime of theft is the 
formation of an intent to permanently deprive the owner 
of his property. On the other hand, the crime of joy-
riding requires as an element of proof an intent to 
just temporarily deprive the owner of his property. The 
intent to permanently deprive is not a progression of an 
intent to temporarily deprive. To state it another way, 
the joyriding intent does not mature into the theft 
intent. A culprit who takes the automobile of another 
has either the intent to permanently deprive or the 
intent to temporarily deprive. He cannot have both 
intents because the one is exclusive of the other. 
Therefore, it follows that the greater offense of 
theft of an automobile does not include the element of 
intent to temporarily deprive. Under the rule of 
Futamata, supra, before an offense can be classified 
as a lesser included offense of a greater crime, the 
establishment of the greater must also necessarily 
establish all the elements required to prove the lesser. 
As a consequence, it must be concluded that joyriding 
is not a lesser included offense of theft, nor is an 
attempt to commit joyriding a lesser included offense 
of attempted theft." 
490 P.2d at 1300. 
In reviewing the procedure involved in the instant case, it will 
be noted that the trial judge ruled that 41-1-109 was a lesser and in-
cluded offense of the information which charged appellant with felony 
auto theft pursuant to 76-6-404 and 412 (R. 95, 96). Because this 
ruling is in direct conflict with the Court's holding in State v. Ash, 
supra, appellant urges this Court to reverse the judgment of guilt and 
discharge him from the custody of the Third District Court. 
6. C.R.S. 1963, 13-13-2 
7. 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-2 
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POINT II 
THE COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE THEFT CHARGE 
PRECLUDED" A LATER FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. " ~~ 
Even if this Court does not accept appellant's argument as outlined 
in Point I of this brief, it is his position that the trial court 
acquitted him of the charge contained in the information; and it was 
only after discussions among counsel and the court that the Honorable 
Gordon R. Hall changed his mind and the verdict, and found the defendant 
guilty of a lesser included offense of unlawful taking of a motor 
vehicle. Appellant contends that when Judge Hall pronounced the appel-
lant not guilty of the charge of theft, the trial ended and he could 
not later return to the subject and find him guilty of a lesser in-
cluded offense. 
The sequence of events in the trial of this matter is very important 
After both sides had rested, counsel for appellant made his closing 
argument and cited the precedent of State v. Ash for the proposition 
that Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle under 41-1-109 was not a 
lesser included offense of theft as charged in the information (R. 90-91) 
The trial court then indicated there was reasonable doubt as to the 
theft charge and indicated he agreed with counsel that 41-1-109 was 
not lesser included and would require a separate prosecution. The 
following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: The Court in this case does have a reasonable doubt of 
the intent of the defendant in this matter and is prepared to so rule. 
However, it is very obvious to the Court that in light of Ash that any 
further proceeding probably would require an action to be filed. How-
ever, I hesitate to have the State go to that extent and also to have 
-8-
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you defend such an action. And my suggestion to you now would be 
that if we cannot necessarily show that as an included offense, that 
of depriving an owner, that you consider at this time the possibility 
of a new complaint in this court being filed and have the Court dispose 
of that now rather than starting afresh all over again. No question 
in my mind but whether he's guilty of the misdemeanor. 
MR. HAYCOCK: We have alleged that Ash doesn't preclude that 
finding and the Court has had all kinds of experience wherein this 
very counsel stipulated under this section it's an included --
THE COURT: My only concern is that Mr. Keller has made such an 
issue of it. I have on other cases permitted it to become a lesser 
and included offense and have found guilt on that rather than on the 
felony. 
MR. KELLER: I feel it is my duty on behalf of my client it's 
not a lesser included offense and I believe the language --
THE COURT: I understand that and that's the reason I don't want 
to have any difficulty over it and what I am suggesting is I am not 
prepared, if I acquit the defendant on the felony charge I'm going 
to require the prosecution to proceed on the misdemeanor offense; and 
I do not intend to release the defendant today. 
(R. 90-91) 
It will be noted that appellant maintained the position that the 
misdemeanor charge was not lesser included and that the Court seemingly 
agreed, stating that he would require the State to proceed on the mis-
demeanor charge in a seperate action. The exchange was culminated by 
the court's pronouncement of acquittal: 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, it would be defendant's position to remain 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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firm that it is not a lesser included offense at this point and ask 
the Court to consider the case on that basis. 
THE COURT: Knowing the position of the Court, Mr. Keller, re-
garding the misdemeanor I'm going to require a prosecution on that. 
Do you have any suggestion on that? 
MR. KELLER: Yes. May we assume at this point the Court has 
acquitted the defendant of the greater offense? 
THE COURT: The record may show that the Court does now acquit 
the defendant of the offense as charged, that of theft, a felony 
of the second degree. 
After this pronouncement of acquittal by the court, arguments 
were heard as to whether the State could refile a new complaint. The 
appellant took the position that since he had now been tried once 
for this criminal episode and acquitted, that a separate trial would 
be subject to a plea of former jeopardy. This issue was argued by 
both counsel for some period of time (R. 90-95). The Court then 
interjected the following statement: 
THE COURT: The Court has again reviewed the content of the 
Ash case during the argument of counsel and head note number 2 there-
in would indicate that a subsequent prosecution is not barred by a 
finding of not guilty on the felony. And as I indicated to you 
previously, this Court has on other occasions -- more than one, found 
the defendant guilty of a lesser and included offense and rather than 
put the State to any further efforts by way of filing an additional 
complaint in this matter, the Court now further finds that the defendant 
in this case is guilty of a lesser and included offense, that of un-
lawful taking of a motor vehicle under the provisions of Title 41, 
Chapter 1, Section 109. What is your desire as to time for sentencing, Digitized by the Howard . Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Keller? 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, this Court then reverses its judgment of 
acquittal? 
THE COURT: No. I acquitted him on the charge of the felony, 
find that he's not guilty of that, but guilty of a lesser and included 
offense, that of unlawful taking of a vehicle. No reversal that I 
intended in my mind, or intended to convey to you; I am not able to 
find him quilty of a felony. 
(R. 95-96) 
With all due respect for Judge Hall, despite his statement that 
he was not reversing his judgment, he clearly adopted a different 
position than he maintained at the time he pronounced his verdict of 
acquittal (R.62). He overruled his former judgment that the misdemeanor 
of Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle was not lesser included in auto theft 
pursuant to State v. Ash, supra, and ruled that it was lesser 
included. He then convicted the appellant of that misdemeanor offense 
(R. 66-67). 
Even assuming this Court overrules its previous position in Ash, 
appellant maintains that once Judge Hall pronounced his acquittal of 
the charge as contained in the information, the trial ended and he 
should have been discharged. As a matter of fact, Utah Code Ann. 
§77-33-12 (1953) clearly requires such a procedure: 
"If judgment of acquittal is given on a verdict, and 
the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause, 
he must be discharged as soon as the judgment is given." 
The arguments of counsel after the verdict was pronounced were 
immaterial to the trial that had just ended. Whether or not the mis-
demeanor charge could have been refiled in a separate action should have 
had no effect on appellant's trial for auto theft which had just ended. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It would be helpful to compare this situation to that of a 
jury trial. Appellant had waived a jury in this case which he had a 
right to do pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-27-2 (1953). Utah's Code 
does not spell out procedures in a non-jury trial which are different 
than procedures in a jury trial and so it must be presumed that, except 
where obviously unnecessary (as in jury instructions), the legislature 
intended that a Judge sitting as trier of fact should conduct a trial 
as though a jury were present. (See Utah Code Ann. Chapter 27, 
Mode of Trial) Assuming this to be the case, Judge Hall's procedure 
would have been tantamount to the jury having returned from its 
deliberation with a verdict of acquittal, then after argument of 
counsel as to whether or not the defendant could be tried on another 
charge, reversing its verdict and finding him guilty of that other 
charge. In a jury trial, Judge Hall would have had to decide whether 
or not the misdemeanor was lesser included in the felony before the 
jury retired to deliberate. Certainly, the judge would not have been 
able to reverse his decision as to the lesser offense after the jury 
came back with a verdict of acquittal. Surely he could not have sent 
them back in to deliberate on the appellant's guilt as to another 
offense. 
This Court considered an issue similar to the one raised in this 
appeal in the case of State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (1975). In that 
case the defendant was charged with first degree murder, and waived a 
jury in the case. One of his grounds for appeal was that the judge who 
heard the evidence retired from the bench and another judge signed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though these were consis-
tent with the verdict of the trial judge. This Court found no error 
in the procedure. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Crockett 
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stated: 
"The statement by the judge quoted above clearly placed 
in the record his verdict and judgment." 
532 P.2d at 1005. 
It is important at this point to quote that statement of the judge 
Justice Crockett referred to: 
"The parties having rested and submitted final 
argument, this is my ruling: I find that the defendant, 
Stewart Michael Kelsey, is guilty of the crime of murder 
in the second degree. The testimony of two of Utahfs 
most distinguished medical doctors, one a psychiatrist, 
and one a forensic pathologist, coupled with other 
corroborating testimony, demonstrated that the defendant 
had a diminished ability to control himself in the 
commission of this crime, and therefore, the elemnts of 
murder in the first degree beyond those requisite for 
murder in the second degree were not proved by the state 
beyond a reasonable doubt. I do find, however, that the 
state has proved each and every element of the crime of 
murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt." 
532 P.2d at 1005. 
It will be noted that instead of merely announcing an acquittal 
of first degree murder, the judge announced there was insufficient 
evidence for first degree murder but at the same instant pronounced 
the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree 
murder. The language of the Supreme Court decision indicates that it 
was at the instant the verdict was pronounced that judgment was entered. 
That case is powerful precedent for the instant case, and appellant 
asks this court to reaffirm its holding that once a verdict is 
announced, judgment occurs and the trial is ended where there is no 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons previously stated, appellant urges this Court to 
reverse his conviction and order him discharged from the custody of 
of the Court on this matter. 
_i o_ 
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Respectfully submitted, 
LARKY R J^CELLER 
Attorney jfor Appellant 
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